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by
Stephen A. Resnick
Introduction
This paper endeavors to accomplish two things:

to offer an historical

explanation for the possible emergence of a capitalistic mode of production
in the development process; and to suggest how this ~arti~ular path has been
constrained and moulded by the international economy.

The argument presented

is basically theoretical in nature but does attempt to transcend the somewhat
narrow interpretation of development economics in terms of the dualistic
and/or surplus models.

There is a limit, however, to how far theoretical analy

sis can go without careful presentation of empirical cases"

The purpose of

this paper is only to suggest certain key elements in a given country's economic
history which might make it a candidate for the particular scenario described
by the model.

By so doing perhaps various special cases of capitalistic develop•

ment may be understood as being part of a wider historical process.
Are there any specific elements which suggest that in a given under
developed country a capitc>.listic mode of production may be emerging?

Three

important factors need to be considered:
1)

The irnport··substi tut ion

c-;:

forced industrializati on programs since

World War II can be viewed as an attern?t by the government to create or fur
ther the development of a class of private businessmen or entrepreneurs who
1
This is what is meant
will be willing to hold and mana 6 s industrial assets.
by the emergence of a capitalistic mode of production,

If this notion is

accepted, then what historical factors were present which produced a class

receptive to the various stimuli provided by the stat0?

Connected with this

is the further que;stion of whether the~l·e now exists elements of the class
structure which tend to limit capitalistic development?

Does the land lord

class or "comprador" element form n possible barrier to capitalistic develop
mant in a given underdeveloped cot.:ntry?

2)

Post-war iniustrial developmeat car.. be characi:erized by the emer-

gence on a national scale of the smn~ m1even development that was the out2
1 co 1· on1.a
·
' 1 sysr:.::m,
•
+· ·
·
f ea t ure o......: th
•
...iona.,_
1.ncerna
. e previous
s t and1.ng

Similar to

what occurred under coloni1:11ic2, there has been a dee.peuing of capital, a rise
in wages, and an expansion of m::.nu£actu:::ing emr,loyment for a few privileged
workers while most of the population continues to live in poverty, especially
in the rural ar';as.

Historically; howe--re:-, the,~e two pe:ciods differ in that

colonialism was marked by accumu:!.ation principally for the benefit of a foreign
class while successful cc1pitali3t accumulation i!'.l the post~colonial world must
involve the active p3rticipati:;n cf a national bourgeois classo

In this sense,

there is one rather than ·two distim:t ;,:,hases of capital accumulat:i.on but the
agents of change hav~ b2en lf,cd:i_ f:i.ed,

lf this :i..nte:rpr2tai:ion is nccepted, then

again the question arises ,;once'.i'.'ning the ;:1ature of this bourgeois class, its
source of wealth, and its particular relationship ':o the now independent state.
For example, shou1.d cn'3 reg<:1rct industrial progress sin:::e the War and strategies
used by the governmer.c .::.s c:mstituting an environment fovorsble to the creation
of a capitalistic mode of pzod11ctio11'l

En,,:; the eme·::ging bou:rgeois class been

successful i::.1 seeking ne·.~ wA:r, of investing j_;:3 \vealth in

ri.e,-J

formi::, cf produc-

tion?
.At this p.:iint, it 5.s usefo1. tc- cL.stingu1.sh between .,,hat Marx referred
. . 1·1.sm, 3 and to raise the questi.on of which path might
~ cap1.cs
t o as t wo pa th s co
appropriately describe the l::ransitio:-1 ~:') c.::1f,i ta lL,m in certai:1

underdeveloped

countries.

Is the development pattern observed similiar to what historically

occurred in the United Kingdom where, according to Marx, "the producer becomes
merchant and capitalist" and His the really revolutionizing path;" or is it
closer to the second path where elements of the merchant class become capi
talists?4

This paper suggests that the economic experience of certain under

developed countries conforms to the second route or merchant to manufacturer
path rather than to the English (or West European) modeL

A problem arises,

however, in that Marx referred to this second path as being non-revolutionary
in that the merchant class became eventu.slly

11

an obstacle to the real capitalist

mode of production and goes under with its develorment,, 115

What are the socio

economic conditions then ,;,:ihich tend to ;nake this process culminate in a
capitalistic mode?

In particular, what is the relationship between the agrarian

and industrial sectors and how does this determine the characteristics of
capitalistic development?
3)

'£his brings us to our third important element.

The government or state in an underdeveloped country plays a crucial

role in fostering the accumulation of capital and correspondingly the develop
ment of capitalistso

Once again the contrast between the colonial and post

colonial periods becomes crucial for the analysis.

Whereas government activity

under colonial rule was mostly directed to investment in export-biased infra
structure, the "big push1 ' once independence was gained is to be found in ex
penditures on education, roads, power or, in general, upon industry-biased
infrastructure.

By using various instruments, especially that of protection

of domestic industry_, the state has attempted to raise the price received by
the capitalist class for his output and/or lo,,Jer the price for his input.
noted this has led to uneven development,.

As

It is almost as if an 1'internal

colonial polici' was followed wheTe industry exploitE:d agriculture and led, as
will be seen., to an alliance of ::he i:apitalist and landlord classes and to an

-4--·

underdeveloped class of free peasants and workers.

Equally important for the

argument of this paper is an attempt by the government to gain a degree of
independence from foreign capital for the development of a national bourgeois
class.

Here the crucial question concerns the role of the multinational cor

porations as a possible barrier to the growth of an indigenous capitalist
class.

The resolution of this conflict willJ in fact, have much to do with

determining the type of process describedo

For if control over the emerging

industrial surplus is in the hands of foreign capitalists, then the national
bourgoisie will turn out to be littla more than junior partners of international
corporations based at the center,

And this result would preclude the possi

bility of capitalistic development as we have defined it.
These three related points form the basis for the following discussion.
We begin with colonialism for its history is an important key in understanding
the complex processes that have occurred since World War II.

Col~nialism
From about 1870 to Worlc1. War II, international capitalism engendered a
commercial revolution in much of the third world.

The extension of the market

led to a reallocation of resources from those activities linked to an agrarian
type of society to those associated with an expanding commercial economy. 6
Production for international markets rather than for own use affected as well
the relationship of the peasant to the landlord, the division of labor based
on the family or village, and traditional tenure or property rights.

The

degree to which all of this occurred throughout the third world was, of course,
uneven.

Different types of colonial rule found in various areas together with

different types of crops and associated techniques of production can be expected

to produce several forms of resultso

Furthermore, many countries were marked

by regional differences such that the econorrdc history of a region was not

that of the country as a whole"

Nonetheless, certain broad similarities seem

to be evident among agrariau societies and their relationship to colonial or
external forces, and specific differences may be easier to understand if the
general model is understood.
From the mid 19th century on, agriculture in the hinterland became in
creasingly .a branch of world industry dominated by capital accumulation and
capitals in the center.

This was not the first time that an increase in

commodity demand was known in the third worldo

Some form of markets seem to

have always existed as evidenced, for example, by the historic triangular trade
among India, China, and Southeast Asia prior to the coming of the West.

None

theless, this trade does not seem to have been of quantitative importance and
international markets remained underdeveloped in character"

The great expan

sion of trade after about 1850; however, was based on the social and economic
circumstances brought about by the Industrial Revolution,,

Technological inno

vations based on capi.tal accumulation, general improvements in international
transport and methods of cornmunicationsJ and the establishment of a financial
center based on London--all tended to make capitalism a universal force
thereby drawing the countries cf the third world into the development process
and commercializing their land and agriculture.

It is in this sense that

Capitalism preceded the commercial transformation of the underdeveloped
countries and made 2conomi c dependence

;:i

uni versa l form,,

The economic development of the agrarian sector implied increasingly
the separation of the producer from owning his means of production and tended
to undermine the traditional or agrarian life centered on the family and village.

The extension of the market meant the production of surplus value rather than
product as the internal division of labor based on a personalized agrarian
society was replaced more and ~ore by the impersonal forces of international
specialization and division of laboro

Colonialism or external circumstances

became then a primary social force in undermining the old agrarian structure
and tended to bring labor power into being in much of the third world.

His

torically, colonialism in many areas of the world did not lead to underdevelop
ment in the sense of making men independent of markets and exchange value; it
began

the development process by establishing the necessary infrastructure

for the primary nccumulation of capita1 1 and for some countries, laid the founda
tion for the transition to capitalism via the (second) route referred to previously.
Is there then an evident pattern in a country's economic history which
tends to explain why such a mode may develop?

Although the extension of the

market undermined the agrarian society, in some areas of the world or in some
regions, capitalism seems to have harnessed a pre··capitalistic mode without
destroying the ties of the peasants to the soil. 7

In fact, the labor services

of the peasant to the indigenous landlord or foreign capitalist were, if any
thing, reinforced,

In other areas, the agrarian sector was truly transformed

by the introduction of new investments snd social organizations but again there
seems to be no agricultural revolution in the sense of producing a rising
,.
v"
bourgeois from the ranks of petty producers or rarmers"

In fact, the develop-

ment of the agrarian sector by capitalistic infh,.ences seems to have produced
several different forms of social organizations and no single case of what
might be calied a success.Eul boul'geois revolutiono

One of the keys in under

standing why one of these forms may result in the emergence of a capitalistic
mode is to be found in the way one treats tte relationships among the peasants,

Where, for example, the landed

the indigenous merchant classJ and the state"

classes did make a successful adjust,nent to the e1cternal market and where
they formed a successful political coalition with the power of the colonial
government, they then se,ved as a vehicle for the transition process.

This

implicitly assumes that this class or ita potential grcwth and development
was not fragmented by colonial administration.

Colonialism or e~:ternal events

acts rather as the midwife for the developii,ent of commercial impulses among
its ranks.
It is the landed classes then or, from within its ranks, an emerging
merchant class that tends to be the revolutionary agent rather than petty pro
ducers in the vi 11.ages or townso

Obviously not all landlords make this adjust

ment and in this case they tend to become a barrier to further change.

Nor

does the transition pro~ess proceed smoothly for the political relationships re
main tenuous in nature e-specia lly those with the foreign government.

And in

fact it takes a major international event that of World War II to shatter finally
the magic of colonial power thereby allowing this class to make the necessary
changes for industrial advances"
Perhaps the most important relationship is between the peasants and the
landlords.

Although the agrarian s2ctor is being transformed, there does not

seem to be a corresponding developm,.:nt of a fr2e anci independent class of
peasants or petty bourgeois producers.

Labor power is being produced in

creasingly for the lord rather tha;.1 directly for the market economy and a wage
labor system only slowly emerges (at times peculiar to certain crops and/or
regions).

Indeed, it is only after World War II when industrial capital tends

to dominate that one can speak of the existence of a capital-labor system.
The landed upper class is able to preserve if not strengthen its poli
tical and economic podtion ,,bile extracting

2

marketable surph,s from the

rural society.

The essential point is that the commercial development of the

country whether it directly or indirectly serves a foreign class leads to an
intensification of the social relationships between the indigenous landlord
class and the peasant sector.

A fusion of interests emerges between this

landed class and the state to maintain the oligarchic system while sufficient
reforms or changes are introduced from above to generate a surplus that can be
exported profitably.

Correspondingly, a variety of political and traditional

devices are used to tie the peasant to the land rather than relying upon a
labor market to ensure the neces8ary work force for the growing export economy.
The police power of the state together with the intensification of different
types of tenure and pe0nage arrangements and the attempt to maintain tradi
tional social relationship between peasant and lord serve to create a new
equilibrium.

Simultaneously,; external events act to reduce the autonomy of

village life: fragment rural industry, and bring about increased specialization.
Thus, the very rationalization of the eccnomic order under commercialization
acts paradoxically to prese;:ve the dominance of the landed elite over the
large peasant sector"

At this point) a concrete example of this type of

agrarian organization is provided.
The Philippines provide a good case study of the type of historical
process so far described.

A

v~gorous class has appeared within Filipino

society whose economic interests are increasingly tied to industry rather than
to agriculture.

Yet, a capitalistic mode is emerging without the destruction

of the historic base of peasant agriculturee.

It is in this sense that there

has never been an agrarian revolution in the Philippines.

The character of

Filipino capitalism is that it has been erected on the basis of an alliance
between the larger merchant families and the ruling class of landlords, and

the historic source for this relationship is to be found in colonial rule,
first Spanish then American.
What is important to an understanding of why capitalistic development
may be viable within the Philippines is the realization that a relatively power
ful native elite was initially formed under Spanish colonialism and further en
couraged and strengthened under AmeTican rule"

This class often having its

initial source of wealth in agriculture under Spanish rule and then in mono
polistic profits of agrarian induced manufacturing under American becomes
responsive to the favorable :i.ndustrial environment treated by the new commercial
policy of import substitution iJ the 1950's and 1960:s.

The dominant position

of the landlord class can be traced back to the type of pol:.i.tical and economic
Hispanization experienced r.,Jhere the government confered special political
privileges and rights to land holdings upon a small group of Filipinos in
turn for their help in administrating the colony,,

9

re-

In fact, in land holdings

there has been a continuity from early Spanish times to the present, and various
forms of tenant farming and debt peonage have existed for centuries. lO
The very class (and religious) system relied upon by Spain to govern
produced a class Guite capable of mounting the first organized anti-colonial
movement in Southeast Asia (1896)"

The increased income and political power

enjoyed by this class; once Spain seriously opened her colony to world trade,
led paradoxically to the downfall of Spanish rule.

For too long Spanish

rulers had remained on the sidelines watching a kind of free play of economic
forces among Filipinos and the relatively newer western interests (British
and American foreign traders) attracted by profitable opportunities.

11

And

once (in the 1890's) the colonial government attempted to resist the pressures
brought by the native elite fer continued economic if not social change, a con
flict ensued.

In a sense, SpaL7. had been tee,

11

successful11 in creating an

-10-

indigenous class of potential entrepreneurs; the Spanish tended to become an
underdeveloped eJ_ite in their own developing colony.
When the Americans arrived upon the scene, a responsive Filipino class
was willing and able to take advantage of the increased market incentives soon
to be opened to the colonyo

American colonialism did little to disrupt the

class structure inherited from Spaino

The native elite was granted more or

less political and economic p,Jwer over the economy as a fusion rather than a
conflict of interests emerged between this class and the colonial government.

12

The free trade an:angem8nts imposed by the Americans, especially
between 1910 anc 1934, lead to increased agrarian specialization.

This process

actually dates back to 1870 when the Ph:Llippines had begun the transformation
into an export economy.

Resources were reallocated from producing mainly food

crops to increased specialization in exports, e.g., sugar, abacca, tobacco, and
then during American rule, copra and coconut oil.
reflect this overall movement from 1870 to 1938.

13

Various events tended to
The economy became a net

importer of rice as regions increasingly specialized in export crops according
to their comparative advantagec

As

labor requirements in agriculture rose,

its needs were met by the decline of labor-intensive rural industry which was
more or less destroyed by 1938.

Here foreign imports replaced home produced

manufactures and this substitution was most dramatic in the growing importation
of textile manufactures,
The surplus generated from the gains~from-trade between the United
States and her colony remained within the Philippines providing the basis for
an induced industrial growth of agrarian related industries, some import
substitution in manufactures, and for government investment in productive
activities.
expansion.

14

Macro evidence suggests si.gni ficant agrarian and non··agrarian
The motivating force behind much of this growth was the emerging

merchant-capitalist class whose origin can be found irl' the Spanish period and
whose effectiveness is nurtured by American policy.

In fact, it was often

the case that the established landlord and new merchant class not only came
from the same sugar provinces but they were the same people or members of the
same family.

And it was wealth based on land holdings concentrated in a

small class of Filipinos that tended to domj_nate political power throughout

.
Amer1.can
ru l e. 15
The new trading opportunities imposed by the Americans did have pro
found effects on Filipino society.

Not only was there an intimate relationship

between the growth of exports and the expansion of manufactures but it was
during the period of rapidly g:cm,Jing exports that muci.1 of the change in
agrarian organization_, government bureaucracy, and health and education advancements took place.

16

Thus, the growth of external trade had an important

if not leading role in changing agricultural production and thereby relation
ships within the agrarian society.

It was as well the necessary catalyst for

changes in the commercial life of the Philippines.
What is to be stressed, however, is that these events were not inde
pendent of changes in the structure of Fi. lipi no society,.

Trade expansion of

the colony first under Spanish th"m American rule was not the sole instrument

producing the trandtion from an ag·rari.an to

E;

commerciel economy.

Spanish

colonialism and the cotmnercii,1- and s0cial policies of the fclJowing American
rule provided the necessary environment for the eventual flourishing of a
Filipino merchant-capitalist cl.ass.,

A class whose source of wealth was formed

in the trading fortunes generatt:d by the export boorn.

Thus to understand the

development of Phi lippi-ne capitalism, one oust analyze c.grefully both the
growth of the expo:r.t 8conomy and the ,:hanges l n the under lyircg ins ti tutiona 1

or class structt!re.

The int::-::·actio11 among pe.1s2nts, landlords, and the govern-

ment bureaucracy provides the essential social ;nd political framework within

which the story of the export economy can be told and an.a lyzed.

'What ·was

necessary was that the cacique class produced under Spanish colonialism became
the merchant capitalists under Ameri~an colonialism and then manufacturing
capitalists under the protection policies of the 1950 1 s and 1960 1 s.
One needs to be ca~eful to distinguish between the emergence of a
merchant-capitalist class and the introducticn of a new sector that of manufac
turing.

The mode of production in the pre-war Philippine economy was not capi

talistic in the sense of private entrepreneurs owning and managing industrial
assetso

This complex awaits the 1950 1 s and 1960 1 s.

What is implied by the

colonial period is the initial beginnings of industrialization as the merchant
capitalists begins to transform the 2gricultural surplus into both agrarian re
lated manufacturing such as sugar and rice mi 'i.ling and non-related industry
1 .,

such as printing_, saw~mi lling, and cemento ~,

The source of wealth remains

agriculture and in some sense the new me:rchant~[;apitali.st is the dual of the
landlord who is inclined both to agriculture and industry,.

Given the structure

of Philippine society, it is diffi,~ult to ,:~is.:inguish bet,;.;een them in any
meaningful sense.

Nonetheless, whatever name :me wishes to provide, the rele
1

vant point concerns their oehavj_or in the gene·cation of a surplus and its
effective use.
Even though cc:nme'l'.'cial influences were permeating rural life, the
attachment of the peasant to the soil an<l the relationships between lord and
peasant were intensified rather than weakenedo

Althcugh the agricultural

sector became relatively less important than manufacturing as a contributor
to national product between 1902 and 1.93f>, the relative size of the labor force

. agr1.cu
. lt ure vis~a~v1.s
.
. non-agricu
· 1...ure
t
d 1.u
· 1 no t s h ow a correspond1.ng
·
d ec 11.ne.
·
lB
1.n
Agriculture remained the major source of employrr,2nt ·while the Philippine economy
was transformed from an agra:ria:1 i.:c a semi=.i. :-,.dustrial count'l'.'y

0

-13Within the agrarian sector, rice output more or less expanded to meet
population growth and the importation of rice declined monotonically from
1902 to 1938.

Export production expande;d dramati.cally from 1910 to about 1934.

Rural industry especially that of rice and sugar milling was replaced by or
ganized manufacturing with a much higher productivityo
true in the case of sugar processing"

This was especially

~he labor thus released from very labor

intensive rural industries flowed into agra:cian activities but mostly rice
production given the more capital intensive nature of export (mainly sugar)
.
.
cu 1tivation.

R"ice pro duction
.
b ecame then
- b or inte~sive.
.
.
19
more la

The power of the landlord over the peasant was reflected in a variety
of ways.

As the upper c:i.ass turned incJ;",;asingly to the ma1·ket econollo/, the

owner:ship of land became more important as a factor of production than as a
traditional symbol of prestig,c:,,

Peasants who either haJ. legally owned their

land or, more likely; who had been farming iand thought to be their own soon
found thems31ves in a tenant relationship whe,~e up to 50 ?ercent of the crop
went to the lordc.

And as in many agra-ci.an societies, debt peonage was a well

known characteristic or rural life~

Historically, these re.nts seem to be

relatively constant based more on custor;, and tradition than on any estimate
of the implicit shadow rental of landn

When tradition came under pressure,

there was recourse to private armies by the landed elite.
Peasant life remained, therefore, closely linked to ti.1is dominant
class.

Tenure arrangement1; far from declining under commercial development

steadily increased from 1902 to 1938c.

Those regions in which growth of an

agricultural surplus was most pronounced were the same in which the rate of
increase in tenancy was highest,

The rice and sugar lcrds were able to extend

labor services and, on the basis of the tax_. squeeze a aurplus out of the

peasants to support their position.

And it was a portion of this surplus

that was financing the expansion of the non-agricultural sector ..

~

Emergence_. of a Cap~s!-i,S~Mode o~,£Q,!!

The weakness of the center as reflected by the depression of the 1930' s
and the world war of the early 19ti.0 1 s ushered in a new political and economic
era for many countries of the third worldc

'l'he ideology of national indepen

dence and the organization of industry we::·e cleal'ly at the heart of the
change.

One of the most important characteristics of the post war period was

the attempt of the government to manufacture a class of businessmen or capi
talists who would be able and willing to hold and accumvlate industrial assets.
This has been a long and costly process and the c,Jntradicticns of the involved
policies are as well known as the successes,

Nonetheless, where colonialism

or foreign influence did not frustrate the development of a native bourgeois
class, the post~war invt;stment in capitalist learning has tended to result in
the emergence of a capitalist mode of production.

As just argued, the..

Philippines would be such a cssee

.
. severa 1 ways. 20
. ,
. 1·izat1.on
The government promoted 1nuustr1.a
1.n

The most

obvious example was provided by its investment in social infrastructure; power
plants to feed industry; roads and comnmnication systems to break down inter
nal barriers to trade and create new channels for information to be diffused;
and education to train a w::,rk force to hc1ve the necessary attributes and dis
cipline for factory worko

Equally important was the government's role in

stimulating industry by protectionist policies or what has now become known
as import-substitution programs,

These various activities of the state are

no doubt a product of the so~iety at a r.::ertain stage of its 2conomic develop
mento

For many developing ,~ountries, however, government action of one form

or another has had a long trad.itiono

Moreover,, the economic experience of

developed countries has p1:oduced a stock of rather sophisticated techniques
of state management and control upun which the latencomer government can draw.
There are good his tori ca 1 :~ea sons then 'Which make government action so
characteristic of our era.,
Yet, the government may be forced to a~t as an engine of capitalist
development because of the particular devP-lopment process experienced.

It is

quite possible that the so~called second path to capitali2m would not be a
viable route if the nativ2 merchant capitalists, p::oduced 1:>y commercialization,
could not direct government expenditures i::o their own neGds nnd uses.

The

coalition bet·eveen the landed and indust1:ial eliL, requires a strong state not
only to promote th2 economic interests of chis •~lass (by creat~_ng an environ
ment favorable to the accuraulat:"on of capital) but also to preserve its poli
tical position over the lE::cge peasant sect::ir and newly emerging industrial
labor classo A capit2listic mode is establishr::d without destroying the old
political ordero

And state policy 5_s used to maintain this structure especially

by keeping rural and urban workers in place while encouraging the capitalist

to get on with his business of accumulationo
This process is, of course, neither smooth nor potentially very stable.
The very coalition between landlord and industrialist increasingly comes under
pressure as the latter group inevitably gc::ins more economic and therefore
political powerc

It is true that the bourgeois we:::-e associateci with the landed

elite from the beginning of colon:L:ilisrn (ac ~-n the: Philippines), ot· were de
rived from the same farn:i.lyJ but ove-.:: time one would expect newer elements to
appear who might threaten the; old equi lib:.·ium,,

The rise of new industries,

for example.. may imply new cour-::es of cap:i.tal:Lst power,.

In addition, the

emerging urban p1.-ofest:-Jonal ciasses, oftf':n associ.:.1 ted with gov2rnm2nt employment,

give rise to new needs and desireso

Thus, the class system tends to change

as some landlords become industrialists (and perhaps vice versa), new sources
of capital and capitalists are formed in the cities 7 and with the heavy em
phasis on industrialization1 there is a relatively quick emergence of an urban

pro letaria to
Nonetheless, the inherent contrac'.ictions of the st.t:ategies followed
are perhaps more pronounced under this path to capitalism than the first, or
"producer to capitalist11 rout2Q

There is a basic unevenP.ess of development

and its benefits v1hid1 produce the ever p:;:eser,.i: danger of revolt in the
countryside, and create new possibilities o:!: unrest in the cities.

A large

peasant sector rem&ins intact whi lE:: landed weslt"!:l continues to be concentrated
in a few hands.

In the u:roan area, a manu±acturing sector dev~lops rapidly

where a small group of privileged workers i.n well··organiz2d capital intensive
establishments co-Axist wit}'. a larse body of poorly paid worke1·s i.n unorganized
crafts and service establishments.

The basic political and economic hegemony

of the landed and capitalist class is not broken and_, as under colonial rule,
a middle class in both the rural and urban areas ia undere2veloped and politi
cally weak.

The gap between rich and pco:r widens0

Thus the cc:>ntinued under

development of th2 countryside and the generation of a new peasant strata in
the cities pose the greatest inter.nal thre.:it to the coalition which forms the
core of the political structure,

In oth8r wcrds, the rate of return on the

second path is relatively high so long as an alliance between :.:·ural and urban
poor is prevented.
The effect of government action and industrialization fall mostly on
agriculture.

Resourcess, food and labor_, :nust be :rea:'..loc;Jted from this sector

to industry"

Th1::: ovc-.call pt·otcctio,:1 affr.;,ded i:he indusrrial sector allows in

turn profitable opportunities in ·which the agri.:::·c'.ltural surplus can be invested.

,, 17··

The effective use of this surplus in one period further increases output there
fore surplus in the next p2riodo

This dynamic process depends on the wage

rate, the level of technology, and the demand for the goods being produced.
But the essence of the capitalistic route is that a class of private business
men or entrepreneurs in whose hands th~ ownership of wealth has been historically
concentrated must be willing to transfer relatively unproductive assets into
.
. d ustria
. 1 c 1aims
.
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Where colonial rule or

foreign influence provided the basis or did not destroy the possibility for
concentration of wealth in a landed .::incl merchar.o.t class, state policy after
World War II was reshaped by this group to prcvide the profitable opportunities
inducing the transfer of a portion of this wealth into industrial capital.
This does not mean that a foreign class under colonial rule did not
benefit from the exploitation of agricultureo

Even in the Philippines, American

investors had non·-negligib le interestr: in sugar processing and overriding
·
c 1aims
on publ"ic uti· 1_ ·i ti· es and m1.ni
· · ng,
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What is meant, however, is that

landed wealth remained mainly in native hands and a significant share of the
trading fortunes generated were held by local groups to make them visable as
a relatively powerful class"

Where an alien complex domi.nated agriculture

and/or the import-export trade, the above scenario would not be appropriate. 23
Nonetheless, even in the case of the Philippines where evidence suggests that
some merchant capital was directed to industry, widespread industrialization
based on a capitalistic mode was not present~

Industrial wealth was located

and owned by capitalists in the center while landed wealth was controlled by
a sma 11 group of Fi. lipinoso

And, as previously indicated: tl-~ere was a fusion

rather than a conflict of interests between the two groups.

Thus, the state

ment made that accvmulation under colonialism was for the benefit of a foreign

class means that or,ly this class was able to realize the benefil:s of trans
ferring the gains-from~,trade into industrial capitaL
Given then an enriched class of lords and merchants ·iJho have the means
to invest, ,vhat incentives are provided inducing them to invest in industry?
Various instruments=-tariff protection, subsidies, tax credits, infrastructure,
the fostering of a banking and financial structure--are used to raise the in
ternal price of goods the capitalist seUs whiJ_e attempting to maintain or
lower the prices of his inputs.

Basically, labo1-' is in plentiful supply from

the agricultural sector anc- imported raw materials and capital equipment are
priced below their oppo:cturd ty cost o:r less than what they 'Would have been

under an equilibrium exchange rateo

21,,

Easy access to scarce foreign exchange

is provided once an import license is ohtair.ed and a premium is thus placed on

the politics of businesso
Ready access to subsidized creJit and ta1~

benefits are provided which

often permit investment in manufacturing with a minimum of equity and a maximum
of borrowing.

The fostering of a banking and financia 1 intermediary sector

helps to provide capitalists with a high degree of individual security, i.e.,
portfolios weighted towards low-risk non-industrial securities, ·while encouraging
investment in industry.

In fact, to the sxteP.t that the government can provide

a suitable financial structure, .sccumulation of industrial assets can proceed
while satisfying the preference of wealth holders to include bonds and real

.
h eLr
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The bankj_ng system itself is often intimately

associated with the class structure so that loans are arranged on the basis of
family connections rather than on the impersona 1 mechanism of the market in
terest rate.

The supply of credit may be :restricted to the economy as a whole

but this does not necessarily mean that it is an operating constraint for all

of its members.

A well pla-:ed phone call is often more important in obtaining

back credit than a balance sheeto
In summary, thenJ the pattern of conce;:itration of wea 1th is a legacy
of the colonial past.

Th 2 state under the program of import substitution pro
1

vides the necessary eu.v:b:onment in which there is a profitable rate of return
on manufactnringo

And :::: financial system encourages the transfer of old wealth

into new while creating the necessary a,,sets to satisfy the capitalist desires
for portfolio balanceo
To insure success for this process, c3rtain other conditions are re
quired.

Perhaps the most crucial is the ·relationship between town and country.

Initially the effective detnand for. manufacturing output must be provided by
the large agrarian sector,

Inte:,:nal trade creation marks the post-war period

as much as external trade di.d the p:,_-e-war yearso

The mar2ufacturing sector de

pends on the agrarian to furnish food and ce.:tain

r'.:lW

materials so as to prevent

the internal terms of trade £:.:-om moving against j_ndustry,

This economic

balance between agriculture and ir,::1t1.st~y is matched by a political one.

Not

only is there a cheap supply of labor to industry but i:he capitalist relies
on the landlord tc keep the peasants in line while generating an agricultural
A portion of this su1·plus finds its way_, one way o:"." another, i.e.,

surpluso

family or financial structure; into j_nclastry~

In return, the landed elite

shares political power with the emergir.3 capitalist class.

There is, as noted

previously, a fusion of interests between the growing capitalist class and the
landlords.
The growth of internal trade impli2s a -wider divisj_on of labor and
specialization throughout 211 sectors..

P.s the internal market for commodity

production expands, so doc'.~ the m2:cket for lahor and th<::I7efore capital.

A

point is reached -where :Lnvestment in agriculture is essential to provide a

,,.

growing supply of food and labor to the expanding urban areaso

The compromise

or fusion between industrial and lnnded eHt2. comes under increasing pressure
as capital tends to dominate both sectorJ thereby challenging much of the

old agrarian social structure,

In these. latter stages of development, it

would not be surprising to find new agri~businesses develop.

Investments--

fertilizers, irrigation_.. and farm equipment-~would ·::,e dire.;::ted ·co the agrarian
sector usually to the benefit of the ld:rge:r farms which hc;ve better access to
credit and management tech11iqueso

The landlo1:·d becomes a capitalist farmer

in his own right replacing the 8ervic0s of peasant labor with those of machines.
The new technology of seed grains or 'iJhat L .~ known as the green revolution
saves on labor enriching the larger farms .:.md their owners and dispossessing
numerous small farmerso

In contrast to what occurred during che expansion

of external trade (where peasant labor was -:::i.•2d to the soi 1) ,. labor is now re
leased by the technological enclosures of the 1970' s.
in the

And the ranks of labor

cities are f;Wolh:.n by individuals seeking employment.
The very su.cces8 cf this type of capitalist development breeds certain

contradictions which, as previOi..rnly noted, threaten the stability of the poli. l structure. 26
tica

The i:nport~- substitution policies lead to an i ni tia 1 con-

centration of investment in an organized and protected manufacturing sector
where there is a rising capital labor-ratio, productivity, and wages for a
small group of workcrG~

The import dependent industrial structure buys a for

eign technology that :Ls labor--saving anci the irnperfect:i..ons in factor markets
result in excessive investmentG in consumer goods indust.cj_es to the neglect of
intermediate and cdpital goods.

An industrial structure emerges where the

favored organized manufacturing se-::to1· .:..:o~exi sts with a large crafts and/or
service sector where :nost of the urba·;1 pe0plr:i a,7'~ employedry
distribution reflects the dualism cf t~1is i.ndust1:i.c:lizatio11

The uneven income
0

This structure is a result of the endeavor of the state to serve the
interests of one group, the national capitalist class, not so much at the ex
pense of the landed elite but rather at the cost of peasant and non-privileged
urban workers in generaL
story ends here.

Nonetheless.,· there is no reason to believe the

An arg'..!ment was just presen-::ed where, at the latter stages

of development, capital would be directed to agriculture for political as much
as economic reasonso

If the state :i.s sophisticated enough to change its policy

in such a way, then presumably it could also .nobilize the excess labor in the
urban areas for the production of capital and intermediate goods.

In fact,

given the above seer.aria of a strong state contr01led by a relatively powerful
elite, there are good political re::rnons why such a switch in policy could be
expected.

There are, however,. external proble£t1S which may make such a change

difficult to accompli.sh~
The change in government activities after the war, the eme:i::-gence of an
urban labor force., and the increased reJ.~.ance on internal trad2 have produced
A

an industrial rather than, as unc'ier coJ.onialism~ a raw material surplus.

basic political question emerges of who will control it=-the national bour
geois class or the capitaJ.ists of the center·?

The latter are represented by

large and powerful multinationa 1 corpo1~ations whose post·,.war interests have in-

creasingly turn2d to manufacturing investments in th·2 third ·woe ldo

At one

level the national anc:' foreign capitalist class have a similar objective:
continued growth of a1:1 industria 1 s9ctor,.

the

At another level, how~ver, their

objectives differ for tl:e capitalists of the cent.er operate in an international
environment where a given underdevefoped c::mntry can only expect to become a
branch plant cou:1t:ry

in which nationa 1 indep,2ndcnce would be erodedo
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Decisions

over resource control, product mi.x and innovation, and corporate bureaucracy

4'

would remain at the center,

As with any ruling group,

there is no reason to

believe that corporate directors would vote themselves out of power allowing
the planning, directing, and control of corporate decisions to be made on a
local level by local businessmeno
The resolution of the c0nflict depends upon the relative bargaining
power of the involved partieso

One of the implications of the argument pre

sented in this paper is that the :.1.ational bourgeois would have the necessary
strength to remain in control of the manufacturing surplus generated.

If an

underdevelop1:;d country has experi,.::nced the particular development p.sth so far
described,, then the gover:1ment would be able to bargain effectively with for
eign capitalists thereby resisting the pressures of the multinational corpora
tion to penetrate the. privileged position of the national bourgeois class.

The

continued development of this s:tass would thus be assured, and the con~entra
tion of industrial wealth would not be diffused~

Direction and control of re

sources would remain in local hands and the political coalition would continue
to have the necessm:-y means to cry and keep the excludP.d groups in line.
If, howe.ve:r., the developmen,: of the national bourgeois we:ce constrained
by the economic and political p•3net:ration of multinational corporations, then
a variety of possible political and corporate configurations co1_;ld result:
an alliance between foreign and domsstic capitE,l ,,here different forms of
joint ventures could b2 establ:i.sned; or foreign subsidiaries investing in key
manufactur:i ng indust::·ies ;,;uch as cigri~buain~ss comple:;:es, pharmac,,ut.ics, or
electronics; or e~1en

::i

uni.on of ::.nten~sts between the landed tlite and the for

eign capitalist to prevent the national bourgeois from gaining economic and
political powero

Whatever the form of social organization that might result

and even though it may appear tha·i: a native business class was growing, the

relationship would be uneven ~L,d political dependence would be the rule.
Since the domestic bourgeoisie ·would not have major ccnt:rol ove:r. the growing
industrial surplus, it could not be assured of controlling the politics of the
country, and over time, its internal and external bargaining power would be
progressively eroded.,

Political decisions would tend to eminate from the

center necessarily implying the exiatencc of a relatively weak govern;nent in
the hinter landc

This scenario assumes, howeveI:, th.:it th(~ multinational corporation
is powerful enough and wi 11 continue to be ao to make its presence felt in
much of the c<;onomic .2nd political life of the u:.:1derdeveloped countryo

There

is reason to believe that new forces tr. the center and in the international
economy wi 11 create di fficultie3 fo-;: the ;:;ontinued hegr.,mony of these corpora-

tionso

New Eou7cccs o:f d.valry vJi.thin the capitalist block> the emergence of

the Common Marke:~ and Japan to challenge t:1c AmcTican pos:~tio1.1) nr,_d the possi
bility of obtaining loans .,:,nd p·cote:~tion from th::: socialist countries allow
new degrees of m.:-rneuverabiH.ty fc:.: the uncc;:developed countryc

C;,:ce again,

howeve:c ;; the establishrn-2nt of a st,.·on:3 stat,~ would be required to adroitly
balance the competing p:r.essures from each of thl-'!:1c blocks.,
Where a government is st·::-ong enou::;h to withstand the pressures from
foreign capital., then pr.esumc:bly impcr,:ted skills sud technology could be used
for the development of the country withou~: :cunning the danger that

the country

These :rec good econorrJ.c

would be used for the b,:cnefit '.Jf a :foreign class.,

reasons ,,hy a de-~1 eloping country mtght buy the ~:ki 11s ancl e:;~pertise of a
developed country"

?'.)reign invectmznt:s ·::ould play an appreciab1'.":! role allowing

the developing country to :Lrapo:rt the services of

.s;

foreign class,

Nonetheless,

for the pur~Josr:,::, of this pape!'.', the cru~ial question is not whethe1· the country
as a -whcle bcn"::f:i.i:s o::- looses from foreign inv-":!s"..:mer.::_. bu·;: :r;;;tber whether the
national bourgeoi3 claso benefiti, or koses.
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Real

value added per occupied person in the total agricultural sector grew at 3.9%
per year between 1902 and 1918, and slightly less than 1% per year between

1918 and 19380

Real value added per occupied person in the total non-

agricultural sector increased at an annual. rate oi t.:.c 1% during the first
period and 3.2% during the second,
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an annual rate of about 6~~"
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agricultural sector from only 12061~ in 1902 to 22% in 1938 which ranked it
first in terms of contribution 31:.l_ghtly exceeding that of the service sector

(21.3%) and the commerce sector (19,. 2%)~

No doubt much of this growth was con-

tributed by tbe expansiQn of rice aGd sugar milling-agrarian induced industries.
However, there seems to

h2vE:

beer. some import.··,substi tut:Lon carried on as the

import content of supplies in the organized manufactur:Lng sector (excluding
food-processing) dediLe<l fc;Jrn 79o4% in J-902 to 51% i.n 1938-

Much of this ex-

pansion was derived from the growth of the shoe, glass, cement, printed pro
ducts, non-metallic> and ::hemical i.ndust-rieso

A rough estimate of whether there was a

flow of savings out of agricul..

ture to finance the expansion of other sectors reveals a more or less balance
between the capital needs of agriculture and the savings originating in agri
culture from 1902 to 1918, and a net savings flow out of agriculture into non
agriculture from 1918 to 19380
Estimates are based on Resnick, !£2..nomic Development of the Philippines
(in progress).
18

The total agricultural sector contributed 50% to real net output in

1902, 48% in 1918, and 34% in 1938.

Labor engaged in agriculture increased

from 51% in 1902 to 61% in 1918 and 71% in 1938a

Much of this increase was

derived from females leaving household tasks and entering agriculture per se
(the male ratio increased but only sl:Lghtly compared to that of the female).
If agrarian and an estimate of agrarian related tasks are included together,
then the proportion of labor in the total agricultural sector showed a slight
decline from 76% in 1902 to 74% in 1938.
19
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see Resnick, "Decline of Rural Industry.. n"•

°For a theoretical model of how the government affects the private

sector, see s. Hymer and So Resnick, "Interactions between the Government and
the Private Sector in Underdeveloped Countries, 11 I. Stewart, ed., Economic
Development and Cultural Change (Edinburgh:

Edinburgh University Press, 1969).
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An industrial accumulation function for the capitalist class was de

rived in Hymer and Resnick, "Capital and Wealth in the Development Process."
The level of real investment in industrial assets, I' J was related to the level
of real capitalist consumption, C 1 , and the level of real investment in other

•

assets, A, where the real change in A is capitalist investment in other forms
of wealth:

gold, money, government securities, foreign assets, land, etc.

··29Assuming that capitalist holdings of non-industrial assets is some fixed
proportions of its stock of industrial capital, K, according to capitalist
desire for portfolio balance, a final equation for the rate of growth of capital was derived:

1

to save; l+>,_

the

K* = .-!L. (r
l+>,_
1

+

>,_

r ) wheres is the capitalist propensity
2

propensity to invest in industry; r

1

and r

2

are the rates of

return on Kand A respectively (including capital appreciation).
this paper is then focused on

>,_

Discussion in

the propensity to hold non-industrial assets.

,,

Mo Dobb, in his Sj;udies.._.in the Devel&.P,~ of Capitalis,m, Chapter V,
refers to two phases of capitalist accumulati0n in the Industrial Revolution:
"a phase of acquL,ition and a phase of realizati::>n (or of transfer of bour
geois wealth into industrial investment)o 11

The above paper and involved model

by Hymer and Resnick is on the latter phase.

However, the pr:.:sent paper argues

that it was the very colonial process of primary accurnuladon that allowed
the concentration of wealth in a few hands (land 7 rural and urban luxury
housing, gold, etc,) and the deliberate policy of the state, once independence
was gai.ned, to ii:1.duce the transfer of some of this wealth into industrial
assets.

Suppose, for exampleJ the government is committed to a certain rate

of industrial growth and prepared to provide the capitalist sector with what
ever subsidization is necessary to achieve ito
tion, the required pTofit rate r

1

J

and hence the

tion of the target rate of growth and of
22

>,_

According to the above equa
required subsidy i3 a func-

~

rn the 1920 1 s, Ameri::an investment in sugar centrals was about 26%

of the tota 1 investmenc: in that industry; Spanish, about 24%,
in Filipino hands,

and 50% was

See Go Fairchild-' R. Corpus, Fo Buencamino, (eds.), Facts

and Statistics about~ Philippine Sugar_ Indu~t'Sl (Nani la, ln8).
70% of the assets in electric utilities were owned by Americans"

Philippines, 193~:, VoL IVo

Approximately
Census of the
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rn colonial Southeast Asia, the experience of Burma, in contrast to

that of the Philippines, would be an appropriate example of foreign (English
and Indian) domination.
24

rn the Philippines, the overvaluation of the Peso during the 1950 1 s

and early 1960 1 s meant an implicit tax on agriculture as export prices in Pesos
were less than what they would have been under an equilibrium exchange rate.
One of the indirect effects of this was the reallocation to a certain degree
of resources out of export agriculture into fo:Jd crops, especially rice (and
corn), ·which minimize pressure on the "rice v;age11 foci ng industry o

Moreover,

preferential arrangements for Philippine sugar in the United States market
allowed the generation of non•negligib le foreign exchange earnings while manu
facturing industries were being protected within the Philippines.

Government

policy, then, in the Philippines and the United States, permitted increased
investment in a growing industry (manufacturing) while minimizing the impact
on a relatively declining industry (export agriculture).

Foreign help, of one

form or another, can be a useful instrument in serving the capitalist process.
25
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26
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